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Introduction
President Donald Trump does not speak like a president. That is to say, he does not speak in 
ways that we have come to expect from presidents. The most striking characteristics of  Trump’s 
rhetoric are what he says and how he says it. The crudeness and cruelty of  his language, his 
ceaseless hyperbolic bluster, and shameless narcissism, his consistent disregard for facts, all 
fall well outside the norms of  modern presidential discourse. However, Trump disregards the 
norms of  presidential communication in another significant way as well, by regularly speaking or 
tweeting off-the-cuff  with seemingly little forethought or editorial input (see Baker 2017; Graham 
2017; Jackson 2018; Tett 2016; Wemple 2018). As White House administrations institutionalized 
presidential speechwriting and strategic communications over the past century, meticulously-
crafted rhetoric became the norm. Trump’s improvisational rhetoric is the antithesis of  the 
highly-professionalized, disciplined approach to political communication we have come to expect 
from the presidency. President Trump does not speak like a president because, more often than 
not, he is making it up as he goes.      
The potential for interpreting Trump’s rhetorical high-wire act is multi-dimensional. 
Politically, his penchant for improvising is celebrated as a badge of  authenticity by supporters 
and seen by critics as a sign that he is unfit for office. Stylistically, the president’s off-the-cuff  
approach can possess rare emotional potency one moment, then slip into utter incoherence the 
next. Psychologically, his ad hoc pronouncements have been portrayed as a strategic genius by 
some and pathological impulsivity by others. These and other dimensions offer intriguing avenues 
to better understand the meaning and significance of  Trump’s rhetorical tendencies. However, 
this essay takes the position that his reliance on improvisational rhetoric is more than a matter of  
politics, style, and psychology; it is a matter of  governance.
Along with serving as a medium for political attacks, personal grievances, self-promotion, and 
miscellaneous nonsense, Trump regularly uses improvised communication to make important 
policy decisions. Banning transgender troops from serving in the U.S. military, declaring a national 
emergency at the U.S.-Mexico border, and withdrawing American forces from Syria, among other 
examples, were policy decisions publicly announced by the president without prior consultation or 
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communication with all relevant stakeholders, including foreign allies, key members of  Congress, 
and administration policy advisors. In other cases, Trump made ad hoc statements about policy 
decisions that White House aides had to walk back or contort the truth to reverse, such as sending 
undocumented immigrants to sanctuary cities, a total shutdown of  the southern border, and the 
possibility of  bombing Iran’s cultural sites. In both sets of  cases, the president conflated rhetoric 
and governance, presenting his personal decision to tweet or speak as a policy action taken by the 
United States government.  
It is tempting to discount the president’s propensity for policy-oriented improvisational 
rhetoric as a Trump-specific phenomenon that will exit the White House with him. Perhaps, but 
the aberration of  Trump’s behavior should not blind us to the fact that the relationship between 
presidents and rhetoric has not been healthy for decades. While Trump’s reliance on improvisation 
is new, rhetorical policymaking, and the tendency to collapse the distinction between rhetoric and 
governing are not anomalous features of  the modern presidency. Instead, they are indicators of  
a distorted system of  governance that Trump neither caused nor created, but rather has pushed 
to new extremes. 
To illuminate the dynamics of  a political order that has long normalized the “not normal,” 
this essay develops the construct of  the “hyper-rhetorical presidency” (DiIulio 2004, 2007). It 
does so by outlining four theses that situate presidential rhetoric within the broader landscape of  
contemporary American politics: 
(1) The presidency is under relentless pressure to meet impossible expectations; 
(2) The presidency does not possess the institutional capacity to effectively address these expectations; 
(3) The presidency must maintain the perception of  power and control; and 
(4) In light of  the three prior theses, presidents are incentivized to innovate ever-more hyper forms of    
 presidential rhetorical behavior.
Taken together, these dynamics contextualize and explain Trump’s reliance on improvisational 
rhetoric as a reflection of  an increasingly distorted political order and dysfunctional system of  
governance. 
To make this case, this essay first outlines the original “rhetorical presidency” construct, then 
turns to an articulation of  the four theses that elucidate its contemporary hyper manifestation. 
This is followed by an exploration of  Trump’s rhetorical behavior, which presents a series of  micro 
case studies that demonstrate his tendency toward improvisational rhetoric and offers insights 
into a contextual understanding of  this phenomenon. The essay concludes with a discussion of  
the implications for governance brought about by a hyper-rhetorical president who makes it up 
as he goes. 
The Relevance of the Rhetorical Presidency
Reflecting on his eight months as the Director of  George W. Bush’s White House Office 
of  Faith-Based and Communities Initiatives, political scientist John J. DiIulio, Jr., explained that 
“on many occasions during my White House tenure…I found myself  focusing on how what 
I was witnessing fortified or falsified this or that academic concept or theory about presidents 
and the presidency” (2003, 247). DiIulio “struggled for a dispassionate way to summarize what 
has happened, and to understand why” before ultimately concluding: “My best guide is The 
Rhetorical Presidency” (2007, 318). 
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According to Jeffrey K. Tulis, the construct of  the “rhetorical presidency” represents “a 
change in the meaning of  governance” (1987, 6) that “puts a premium on active and continuous 
presidential leadership of  popular opinion” (1987, 18).1 This amounts to a reinterpretation 
of  the political order in which the constitutional principle of  separation of  powers and inter-
branch policy deliberation are supplanted by a presidency-centered system and rhetoric that both 
amplifies and normalizes this distorted state of  affairs. Tulis argues that this shift in understanding 
is traceable to the presidency of  Woodrow Wilson, who regarded the “separation of  powers [as] 
the central defect of  American politics” because it impeded the executive’s ability to effect change 
(1987, 119). Directly challenging the view of  the Founders, Wilson argued that the legitimate 
source of  presidential authority is not to be found in the Constitution, but rather in the general 
will of  the American citizenry. Thus, it is requisite for presidents to “interpret” the popular will 
and act as its independent and singular representative in government, for “[t]here is but one 
national voice in the country and that is the voice of  the President” (Wilson 1908, 202). This 
rhetorical responsibility involves speaking on behalf  of  public opinion, as well as shaping it; for, 
according to Wilson, the president serves as the “spokesman for the real sentiment and purpose 
of  the country, by giving direction to opinion, by giving the country at once the information and 
the statement of  policy which will enable it to form its judgments” (1908, 68). 
Central to Tulis’s normative concerns is that Wilson’s doctrine of  rhetorical leadership has 
not only become “a principle tool of  presidential leadership,” but normalized as a legitimate 
tool of  governance (1987, 4). Accordingly, the idea that presidents not only will but should be 
practitioners of  popular leadership is today “an unquestioned premise of  our political culture”—
its rhetorical character has come to be understood as the “essence of  the modern presidency” 
(Tulis 1987, 4). This idea has framed our contemporary understanding of  the office to the point 
that we can, in a very real sense, no longer conceptualize the American presidency without rhetoric. 
Yet, while Wilson’s vision of  the presidency as the unitary representative of  the popular will may 
have saturated our political culture, the constitutional system of  coequal branches created by 
the Framers still exists. The rhetorical presidency has simply been superimposed upon it. This 
amounts to a “second constitution;” that is, “a view of  statecraft that is in tension with the original 
Constitution—indeed, is opposed to the Founders’ understanding of  the political system” (Tulis 
1987, 17-18). The result is a convoluted political order in which the pathologies of  “presidential 
democracy,” which stands in direct opposition to the constitution and risks metastasizing into 
populist demagoguery, have come to overwhelm the American system of  governance. 
Tulis’s argument is a valuable starting point for interpreting the meaning of  Trump’s rhetorical 
behavior because the construct pushes our view beyond the present obsession with the man 
himself. It likewise demands that we expand our analytical lens beyond the executive office as 
well; for, despite common assumptions, The Rhetorical Presidency is not primarily a study of  
presidential rhetoric, nor of  the presidency.2 Instead, “it describes a redefinition of  constitutional 
government that places the presidency at the center of  the political universe” (Crockett 2003, 
469). In contrast to this presidency-centered perspective which holds sway in scholarship, 
media discourse, the public imagination, and in presidential rhetoric itself—a perspective Tulis 
dismisses as “institutional partisanship” (1987, 9-13)—The Rhetorical Presidency presents a 
normative argument about systemic problems within the broader American political order. The 
rhetorical character of  the contemporary presidency both represents and exacerbates these 
systemic problems. Situating the presidential leadership of  public opinion within this broader 
political order is critical; it illuminates the consequences of  a presidency-centered perspective, 
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rather than normalizing and legitimating it. The rhetorical presidency construct, therefore, 
demands that we eschew interpreting Trump’s rhetorical behavior in ways that further fetishize 
the presidency and this president in particular. Instead, it turns the focus to making sense of  his 
reliance on improvisational rhetorical as a reflection of  the contemporary political order, with the 
understanding that his behavior will, in turn, reinterpret, redefine, and further distort American 
politics in ways that will continue to be consequential after he leaves office.       
Four Theses on the Hyper-Rhetorical Presidency 
Two decades after its publication, DiIulio argued that “The Rhetorical Presidency has 
proven to be even better as a political-development crystal ball than it was as a rear-view mirror. 
[…] Tulis was, if  anything, righter than he knew concerning the presidency’s possible future 
rhetorical characteristics” (2007, 317). While in the White House, DiIulio saw the intensification 
of  the troubling conditions in contemporary governance that Tulis had identified. As a result, 
he ultimately determined that “Bush’s administration is perhaps best understood as a hyper-
rhetorical presidency,” which he defined as “the rhetorical presidency on steroids” (2007, 318 
DiIulio’s bold). 
DiIulio’s ‘insider case study’ is the story of  these pathologies of  governance, their amplification, 
and his recognition that “the hyper-rhetorical presidency is now widely considered normal;” 
most devastatingly, within the White House itself  (2007, 322). However, his only publication 
on the subject is a short essay that does not systematically outline the dynamics of  the distorted 
political landscape represented by the notion of  the hyper-rhetorical presidency, nor fully develop 
the construct itself.3 DiIulio’s argument has largely been ignored in scholarship on the presidency, 
garnering brief  references but no in-depth considerations or attempts to apply his construct 
empirically.4 The current challenge to make sense of  Trump’s rhetorical behavior is an invitation 
to revisit the critical insights of  the hyper-rhetorical presidency and further develop DiIulio’s 
construct.5 To do so, this essay presents four theses that aim to articulate the dynamics of  the 
broader political order that accompany and incentivize the hyper-rhetorical disposition of  the 
contemporary American presidency.
Thesis 1: The presidency is under relentless pressure to meet impossible expectations
DiIulio characterizes the ethos of  the hyper-rhetorical presidency as “the politics of  having 
something to say about everything” (2004). In recent administrations, this has taken the form 
of  the generally strategic, sometimes reflexive dissemination of  a continuous stream of  White 
House messaging through ubiquitous spokespeople, press releases, political surrogates, emails, 
social media posts, presidential speeches, statements, informal remarks, and press conferences 
(Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2011; Farnsworth 2018; Farnsworth and Lichter 2006; Kumar 2007). 
But what accounts for this ceaseless flow of  presidential communication? From his perspective 
inside the administration, DiIulio identified the cause as the unyielding pressure to provide a 
presidency-obsessed media with content.6 He explained that media is “demanding answers to 
things, political things, media things, global things, all day long” (2004). As a result, the reality 
is far from the agenda-setting-through-strategic-communications approach commonly discussed 
in the presidency scholarship.7 Instead, presidential communications are largely driven by 
“happenstance, the bounce of  chance, what’s in the news…suddenly [the White House has] to 
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focus on that” (DiIulio 2004). 
There seem to be no realistic alternatives to this state of  affairs. If  media inquire about the 
president’s position on a significant foreign policy issue, such as North Korean nuclear weapons, 
the White House obviously has something to say. However, in today’s media environment, even 
issues that are not directly relevant to presidential decision-making are expected to be addressed. 
If  a self-driving Uber kills a pedestrian and the administration is asked about the president’s 
position on specific regulations regarding self-driving vehicles, it is inconceivable for the White 
House to respond that he does not have one. No matter how obscure the issue, the administration 
is expected to speak to it and do so in a timely way. If  it does not, then that becomes the story. 
Failing to do so would also cede valuable media space to the president’s critics and, with it, the 
power to define the issue, and the president’s silence, in politically advantageous ways (Dickerson 
2018; Holtzman 2011). Nor can the White House take a few days to review facts and develop an 
informed policy position without appearing unprepared, out-of-touch, or simply unconcerned. 
The demands placed on the presidency by today’s multi-platform, 24-hour media environment, 
in which several news cycles pass daily, are relentless (Cohen 2008). 
What DiIulio does not discuss is that the relentless pressure to meet expectations is not only 
driven by media, but by American political culture. In scholarship on the presidency, “there is a 
general recognition…that modern presidents face a wide variety of  public expectations… [which] 
shape how presidents are covered by the press as well as how they are perceived and evaluated 
by elites and the mass public” (Simon 2009, 136). Since the advent of  the modern presidency 
during the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, and the myriad administrative responsibilities 
that accompanied the expansion of  the institution (Rossiter 1956), expectations have consistently 
followed a one-way trajectory toward the impossible (Vaughn and Mercieca 2014). 
Along with the growth of  institutional roles, two additional factors illustrate sources of  
expectations for the presidency. First, how Americans understand the presidency and what 
they expect from officeholders are “formed through political socialization and culture, news 
media, and media technologies” (Scacco and Coe 2017, 299). Research on political socialization 
indicates that narratives of  American history, civic education, and popular culture create myths 
of  past presidents and their heroics that result in idealized views of  officeholders (Simon 2009; 
Greenstein 1975). Consequently, image-based expectations for how presidents should behave and 
what traits they should possess “are both high and exaggerated” (Simon 2009, 140). This heroic 
status is constructed through dramatic portrayals of  past presidential accomplishments that do 
not accurately reflect the extent and limitations of  presidential powers. 
Additionally, presidents themselves are responsible for further-inflating both image-based 
and performance-based expectations by playing to them publicly, thereby creating a feedback 
loop that further exaggerates and exacerbates this untenable situation. The late Theodore J. Lowi 
explains, “since the rhetoric that flows from the office so magnifies the personal responsibility and 
so surrounds the power with mystique, it is only natural that the American people would produce 
or embrace myths about presidential government. The myths are validated and reinforced by 
popular treatments of  the presidency (1985, 151). Portrayals of  the office are also distorted by the 
perception of  a presidency-centered political order and system of  governance that accompanied 
the development of  the rhetorical presidency. As a result of  their reliance on the rhetorical 
leadership of  public opinion, presidents exaggerate this perception and make policy promises 
that collide with the reality of  the constraints in the original constitution (Tulis 1987; Crockett 
2003). When combined with media demands, the pressure placed upon modern presidents by 
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these inflated expectations is relentless.  
Thesis 2: The presidency does not possess the institutional capacity to effectively address these 
expectations 
Modern presidents may be expected to have “something to say about everything,” but the 
institutional capacity to do so—let alone to take meaningful policy action—simply does not 
exist. Recognizing the lack of  capacity to address expanding responsibilities and meet growing 
expectations, FDR declared that “[t]he president’s task has become impossible for me or any other 
man” (quoted in Dickerson 2017). Following the conclusion of  the 1937 Brownlow Committee 
Report that “The President needs help,” the Reorganization Act was passed in 1939, expanding 
the Executive Office of  the President. As the power and responsibilities of  the institution 
continued to grow, a once understaffed administration became overstaffed and presented new 
management problems. As John Dickerson explains in “The Hardest Job in the World,” “…
you might think that extra manpower would be a boon to an overextended president. But unlike 
a chief  executive in the corporate world, a president can’t delegate” (2018). As the president is 
ultimately responsible for every decision made by the administration, decision-making remained 
centralized in the West Wing. 
As a result, the institutional apparatus of  the administration cannot consider and address, 
even in the most superficial way, more than a few key issues at any one time. And as DiIulio 
explains, the decisions that need to be made are countless and varied: 
…the White House is always focused on something. There’s always a couple of  things that are sucking the 
air out of  the room, that are consuming the Oval Office, that are driving the president’s schedule… What’s 
going on is there are a lot of  things that presidents want, there are a lot of  things that people who have 
influence with presidents want…that they cannot get even in the context of  unified party government, 
because there’s too much on his plate (2004). 
He summed up this state of  affairs as “sucking water out of  a fire hydrant twenty-four hours 
a day” (2004). This was confirmed by Dan Bartlett, Bush’s former Director of  Communications, 
who explained that “we woke up every day behind. Every day was catch-up day” (quoted in 
Dickerson 2018). 
The problem of  limited capacity is not one specific to the Bush White House; it is an 
institutional problem that continued into the Obama administration. Jeh Johnson, who served 
as Obama’s Secretary of  Homeland Security, explained: “My definition of  a good day was when 
more than half  of  the things on my schedule were things I planned versus things that were forced 
on me” (quoted in Dickerson 2018). Obama’s chief  counterterrorism adviser, Lisa Monaco, 
agreed that “[t]he urgent should not crowd out the important. But sometimes you don’t get to 
the important. Your day is spent just trying to prioritize the urgent” (quoted in Dickerson 2018). 
As a result, the president’s work is never done. “Every hour brings another demand, another 
obligation, another crisis” (Suri 2017, xvi). Falling well short of  meeting the public expectation 
that presidents act as the nation’s agenda-setter-in-chief, the “hyper-rhetorical presidency is one 
where they cannot control their [own] agenda” (DiIulio 2004). 
Consequently, presidents cannot possibly address all issues. However, when a White House 
ignores a pressing issue, groups advocating for action and their elected representatives criticize 
the administration for its lack of  concern and for cynically “playing politics” with the issue. For 
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DiIulio, this “politics as usual” explanation “would be a lot more comforting, in a sense, because 
it’s sort of  a politics we all understand” (2004). When it comes to policymaking, the reality of  the 
lack of  institutional capacity, as he witnessed it, is far more disconcerting. The presidency “cannot 
deliver anything resembling coherent policy formulation, legislative liaison, legislative politicking, 
bill passage, administrative politics, implementation, execution, performance oversight. It is 
impossible. It cannot be done. The institutional capacity does not exist” (DiIulio 2004). 
While it must contend with outsized expectations for presidential performance, the limited 
capacity of  the modern presidency means that it can often do little more than try to play “keep-
up” with developing events, respond to critics, and attempt to maintain the appearance that 
everything is in control. As Lowi colorfully puts it, presidents “can only put out fires and smile 
above the ashes” (1985, 181). 
Thesis 3: The presidency must maintain the perception of power and control
While expectations are impossible to meet, and the capacity to effectively do so does not 
exist, presidents have no option other than to pretend that they can play at this game and win. To 
do so, the White House must successfully manage and maintain the appearance of  control at all 
times if  it is to sustain political power. In the presidential democracy of  contemporary American 
politics, “there is no power in the presidency if  the public is not with him” (Murtha 2006). As a 
result, presidents are not powerful primarily because of  Article II of  the Constitution—it is the 
perception of  power that empowers.8 And the normalized image of  the president as the center of  
the political order and singular representative of  the American people is indeed a very real power, 
even if  only sustained by public opinion built on perceptions. Therefore, it must be maintained. 
Lowi argued that presidents need to keep and “maintain the initiative, or at least the appearance 
of  the initiative” in order to cultivate “the reputation of  power”—“The president is the Wizard of  
Oz. Appearances become everything” (1985, 138-139, 151). Constructing images of  a presidency 
that is always “in control” strengthens the president’s hand politically and in the policymaking 
arena by warding off  potential criticisms and allowing for the favorable framing of  events and 
agendas. As “the chief  inventor and broker of  the symbols of  American politics” (Zarefsky 1986, 
8), presidents are in a unique position to use rhetoric as a means to maintain this pretense of  
power. Through rhetorical posturing and relentless image control, presidents and their aides take 
every opportunity to publicly reinforce this portrayal.
The presidency also seeks to reinforce the popular myth of  a presidency-centered system 
of  governance by constantly staying “on offense” rhetorically. DiIulio points out that while 
few media sources follow the nuances of  policymaking, “nearly everybody knows and reports 
whether the president has ‘said something’ about a given topic” (2003, 252). In today’s noisy 
media landscape, the president saying something, anything, often matters more than what is said. 
The news cycle is so rapid that what the president said yesterday, let alone last week, will likely be 
displaced by what he says today, and possibly even forgotten. As such, in order to maintain the 
perception of  control, the goal is to fill the space and keep the initiative (Scacco and Coe 2016). 
However, according to Lowi: “The more the president holds to the initiative and keeps it 
personal, the more he reinforces the mythology that there actually exists in the White House a 
‘capacity to govern’” (1985, 151). Consequently, the constant effort to maintain this perception 
has transformed the Oval Office into a golden cage. By portraying the presidency as possessing 
an almost-omnipresent capacity for responsiveness and action, the White House further inflates 
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expectations for presidential performance. And while the presidency cannot accomplish in deed 
that which it continually trumpets in words, it has no choice but to feed this cycle. 
Thesis 4: In light of the three prior theses, presidents are incentivized to innovate ever-more 
hyper forms of presidential rhetorical behavior 
From this crucible of  inflated expectations, the need to maintain perceptions, and the lack of  
institutional capacity to successfully manage either, emerges the incentive for presidents to turn to 
hyper forms of  rhetorical behavior. And as the feedback loop continues and builds, what initially 
appeared to be innovative rhetorical strategies become institutionalized as defense mechanisms, 
fundamentally altering the structure of  the presidency and further distorting the American 
political order and system of  governance. Changes in presidential rhetorical behavior should 
therefore not be interpreted as distinct political instruments, but collectively as a developmental 
phenomenon. That is, each rhetorical innovation does not simply replace the previous one but 
rather is layered upon it.9 This is done to meet the pressing demands of  external expectations, 
as well as those self-created by the outsized portrayals of  the office generated by past rhetorical 
innovations. In this way, like a spiral of  addiction, growing within each rhetorical innovation is the 
need for its more-hyper replacement. A review of  key rhetorical innovations over the past thirty 
years illuminates this process. 
For decades, presidential communications have been professionalized and their processes of  
production formalized. Prior to reaching the ears or eyes of  the American public, communications 
would regularly go through the hands of  many authors, editors, and fact-checkers, and be reviewed 
for approval by various administrative departments and presidential aides (Collier 2018, 36). The 
development of  formalized communications processes can be traced from the presidency of  
Woodrow Wilson, through the expansion of  the White House during the FDR and Truman 
administrations, to the dominance of  strategic communications offices in the George W. Bush 
and Obama presidencies. From this history, the one-directional development of  this discipline 
is clear: “[T]he more power the presidency acquires, the more cautious presidents become when 
they speak” (Collier 2018, 204). 
Strategic public relations are one of  the more manageable aspects of  the modern presidency. 
Far more challenging is negotiating with members of  Congress, who are incentivized to represent 
the interests of  those who get them elected. As a result, presidents must engage in the difficult 
tasks of  persuasion and bargaining to pursue their policy goals (Neustadt 1960). During the 
Reagan administration, Samuel Kernell (1986) identified an innovation that aimed to pursue the 
administration’s policy goals by going over the heads of  those in Congress by using presidential 
rhetoric to persuade the people instead. “Going public,” as he referred to it, “is a strategy whereby 
a president promotes himself  and his policies in Washington by appealing to the American 
public for support,” with the ultimate aim of  pressuring Capitol Hill (Kernell 1986, 1). Empirical 
evidence suggests that this approach is unable to regularly move public opinion on policy issues 
in the administration’s direction (Edwards 2003). Yet, all presidents since Reagan have continued 
to go public. Kernell explains that by “casting himself  as the fount from which the answers to 
the nation’s problems flow, such a president may raise public expectations to unrealistic heights” 
(1986, 45). Consequently, as they raise expectations for their own performance by going public, 
presidents, in turn, create the need for more radical means of  maintaining the perception of  
presidential power and control.    
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Beginning in the Reagan administration, but reaching an apex during the Clinton administration, 
scholarship turned to explore the ways in which presidential rhetoric was increasingly being used 
on behalf  of  the “permanent campaign” (Blumenthal 1980; Edwards 2000). The permanent 
campaign involves using the tools of  governing, image-making, and strategic calculation as a 
means to gain and hold popular support (Edwards 2000; Heclo 2000; Ornstein and Mann 2000). 
In essence, this involves going public for political, rather than a policy-oriented advantage. Like 
going public, the permanent campaign is more than a strategy—structurally, it has become “a 
permanent feature of  the contemporary presidency” (Cook 2002, 762). 
The normalization of  going public and the permanent campaign demonstrate that rhetoric 
is more than an instrument; it is “increasingly is what the presidency is about” (Zarefsky 2004, 
607). In other words, the modern presidency not only uses rhetoric, it is constituted by rhetoric. 
Building on Murray Edelman’s claim that “language is the key creator of  the social world people 
experience” (1988, 103), David Zarefsky maintains that rhetoric “defines political reality” 
(2004, 611).10 To satisfy the need to portray the presidency as powerful and always in control, 
administrations increasingly turned to define reality through the rhetorical innovation of  image 
management. Far from efforts to persuade Congress or the American people to support the 
president’s policy agenda, the crafting of  presidential image is a purely political undertaking. It is 
intended “to force the media to cover the pictures and narratives [the White House] provides” 
(Mayer 2004, 625), thereby attempting to turn its symbiotic relationship with the press to the 
president’s advantage. 
In his study of  the image management of  George W. Bush, Jeremy D. Mayer highlights 
the essential role of  discipline in crafting strategic visual messages and designing sets that serve 
as backdrops for the president (2004). This aligns with DiIulio’s observations about the Bush 
administration’s constant struggle “to stay hyper-rhetorically ‘on message’ and ‘on offense’” (2007, 
321). Doing so and keeping the initiative by defining reality—and in particular, advantageously 
defining the president himself—was valued above all else. Playing to heroic expectations and pre-
packaging dramatic content for media, the Bush White House delivered ready-made spectacles for 
public consumption. As Douglas Kellner explained at the time, in “today’s infotainment society, 
entertainment and spectacle have entered into the domains of  the economy, politics, society, and 
everyday life in important new ways” (2005, 62). Bruce Miroff  developed this observation into 
the notion of  the “presidency as spectacle,” in which “the White House strives to present the 
president as a winning, indeed a spectacular, character” (2018, 231). 
Just as each subsequent president adopted, professionalized, and innovated upon the rhetorical 
techniques relied upon by their predecessors (i.e., formalized speechwriting, going public, the 
permanent campaign, and image management), Kellner argues that it was Obama who mastered 
the art of  “blending politics and performance in carefully orchestrated media spectacles” (2017, 
76). And yet, the Obama White House still utilized an extensive, deliberate speechwriting process, 
along with the other rhetorical innovations. This is the developmental phenomenon of  the hyper-
rhetorical presidency: one rhetorical discipline layered upon the other, each more hyper than the 
last. 
With these rhetorical innovations came a restructuring of  the institution to meet the dynamic 
demands of  the hyper-rhetorical presidency. In 1987, Tulis argued that the rhetorical presidency 
is organized to give “the president an increased ability to assess public opinion and to manipulate 
it.” He expressed concern that the “speechwriting shop has become the institutional locus of  
policymaking in the White House, not merely an annex to policymaking.” Consequently, “the 
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imperatives of  rhetoric structure policy” (Tulis 1987, 185). Ten years later, DiIulio quipped that 
the hyper-rhetorical presidency “is organized (one might say personalized) to do this in its sleep” 
(2007, 323). Structurally, Bush’s Executive Office of  the President had “become openly organized 
and operated like a permanent political campaign headquarters” and, as a result, the “senior 
staff  offices that matter most—speechwriting, communications, press secretary, and ‘strategic 
initiatives’—completely overawe those more tethered to information gathering, policy analysis, 
and policy implementation” (DiIulio 2007, 322). The developmental phenomenon of  turning 
to ever-more hyper forms of  rhetorical behavior has fundamentally changed and continues to 
change, the institutional structure of  the presidency.  
When the structural emphasis on presidential communications supplants and even subsumes 
policy-oriented work, governance suffers. Far short of  the research, deliberation, and compromise 
that goes into a thoughtful development of  policy proposals, in the environment of  the hyper-
rhetorical presidency, “policy gets made (or un-made) on the rhetorical fly” (DiIulio 2007, 322). 
Under pressure to meet expectations and lacking the institutional capacity to do so, there is little 
incentive for engaging the process necessary for developing informed policies, let alone support 
accompanying legislation, for anything but the president’s top priorities. Attempting to do so 
would require a great expenditure of  limited presidential resources, such as time and political 
capital, and increase opportunities for very public failure. Instead, and in stark contrast to the 
strategic policy-orientation of  going public, the primary objective of  rhetoric in the age of  the 
hyper-rhetorical presidency is to maintain perceptions of  power and control. For Trump, this 
means making it up as he goes.  
Trump’s Improvisational Rhetoric 
The Trump presidency is not the rhetorical presidency that Tulis illuminated more than 
three decades ago. Nor is it DiIulio’s hyper-rhetorical presidency of  the Bush era. Today, we are 
inundated with overwhelming levels of  instant information, social media trolling, tweet storms, 
viral memes, fake news, alternative facts, deep fakes, image-based communication, and an average 
of  nearly four connected devices per person. It is also an era of  brutal partisan tribalism, colossal 
sums of  special-interest cash, data scraping and the psychographic behavioral micro-targeting of  
voters, foreign influence, celebritized candidates, contested election results, and intense public 
frustration with the American system of  governance. Consequently, the contemporary political 
order is arguably one of  chaotic hyper-reality, orbiting around its nucleus, a chaotic hyper-
rhetorical presidency. 
Trump’s version of  the hyper-rhetorical presidency represents both continuity and change. 
He uses speechwriters, goes public, engages in the permanent campaign, practices image 
management, and is the “King of  the Spectacle” (Kellner 2017, 76). What he has abandoned is 
the discipline that had been normalized by previous administrations. The historical trajectory 
of  these rhetorical innovations proceeded along a linear path toward ever-more choreographed, 
deliberate, and constructed communication. Rather than following this trend toward more 
disciplined, institutionally-controlled messaging, Trump’s rhetorical behavior obliterates it. 
For example, cabinet meetings provide presidents with opportunities to construct 
advantageous spectacles that can be controlled and, therefore, stay on message. To do so, they 
may include props, such as the sign reading “CHAMPIONS” set behind Trump’s head during an 
October 2019 cabinet meeting billed as a discussion of  the administration’s “successful rollback 
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of  the abuses and the high cost of  the bloated regulatory state.” However, Trump’s tendency 
toward improvisational rhetoric immediately sent the spectacle off  message. It was described as 
a “71-minute affair that was part news conference, part stream-of-consciousness bragging and all 
about Trump” (Dawsey 2019). Without prompting in many cases, the president boasted about 
capturing ISIS combatants (“I’m the one who did the capturing”), dismissed the Constitution’s 
“phony emoluments clause,” attacked President Obama and House Intelligence Committee 
Chairman Adam Schiff  (D-Calif.), advertised his Trump Doral golf  resort (“I’m very good at real 
estate”), bragged about filling arenas at political rallies (“I can set a world record for somebody 
without a guitar”), and made a number of  false statements, all while his cabinet officials sat by 
silently, also serving as props (Dawsey 2019). 
Trump’s rhetoric is “neither deliberate nor cautious, and to an unusual degree, it appears 
to be impromptu, reactive, situational, and improvisational” (Jamieson and Taussig 2017, 621). 
As such, it represents a significant deviation from the trend toward ever-more disciplined, 
professionalized presidential communications. And yet, at the same time, this tendency to rely 
on improvisational rhetoric squarely aligns with the trend of  presidents adopting ever-more 
hyper forms of  communication, incentivized by the dynamics of  a distorted political order that 
seemingly provides them with no other choice.  
The following three micro case studies provide brief  glimpses into Trump’s use of  policy-
oriented improvisational rhetoric. As relevant examples maybe number in the hundreds, the few 
selected here are intended only to illustrate the phenomenon, rather than be comprehensive. And 
while the defining characteristics of  Trump’s rhetorical behavior can only be suggested by such 
a small sample, each case clearly illustrates the conflation of  rhetoric and governance that is the 
signature of  the hyper-rhetorical presidency.    
Banning Transgender Troops from Service
In July 2017, Trump tweeted a decision to ban transgender troops from the U.S. military. 
Although he claimed that this decision was made “[a]fter consultation with my Generals and 
military experts” (Trump 2017), the Pentagon was caught by surprise as they had not been 
informed and an uncompleted policy review on the issue was in the works (Rucker and Parker 
2018). Military officials were also unclear whether the tweet effectively served as an order, since 
it lacked specifics about implementation and the legal status of  command-by-tweet has not been 
determined (Collier 2018, 37). 
Pre-Midterm Election Tax Cut
In October 2018, in the lead-up to midterm elections, the president spent days tweeting teases 
about an imminent tax cut. Then, at a political rally in Houston for the re-election of  Senator 
Ted Cruz (R-TX), he announced: “We’re going to be putting in a 10 percent tax cut for middle-
income families. It’s going to be put in next week. We’ve been working on it for a few months” 
(Trump 2018b). Neither administration officials nor members of  Congress knew anything about 
a planned tax cut. Additionally, Congress, which would need to pass legislation to institute a tax 
cut, was out of  session at the time of  Trump’s announcement and would remain so until after the 
election (Rucker and Parker 2018).
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The Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Syria
While as a candidate he campaigned against further American involvement in Middle East 
conflicts, in April 2017, Trump ordered a missile strike on Syria in retaliation for a chemical 
attack on Syrian civilians by President Bashar al-Assad. According to the White House, he did 
so after being moved emotionally by images of  children who had been victims of  the attack. 
Then, in March 2018, during a rambling speech in Ohio, ostensibly about infrastructure, Trump 
announced that “we’ll be coming out of  Syria, like, very soon. Let the other people take care of  
it now” (Trump 2018a). This took his national security and military advisors by surprise and the 
administration later issued statements clarifying that no timetable for the withdrawal had been 
set. When the president pushed to move on this withdrawal in December 2018, Secretary of  
Defense James Mattis resigned in protest and the policy decision was shelved. Then, in October 
2019, at the prompting of  Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a phone call, Trump 
announced by tweet that “it is time for us to get out of  these ridiculous Endless Wars…and bring 
our soldiers home” (Trump 2019). His impromptu decision to withdraw as rapidly as possible 
once again took the military by surprise, resulting in American military materiel left behind and 
the abandoning of  Kurdish allies to Turkish forces.     
Why Improvisational Rhetoric? 
As his presidency has disregarded norms in so many different ways, it is tempting to dismiss 
Trump’s rhetorical behavior in these micro cases as a Trump-specific phenomenon. Certainly, 
his idiosyncrasies are part of  the story. However, interpreting these examples of  policy-oriented 
improvisational rhetoric in the context of  the distorting dynamics of  the hyper-rhetorical 
presidency offers broader insights into this “not normal” phenomenon. Like his immediate 
predecessors, Trump faces the relentless pressure of  impossible expectations, his White House 
lacks the necessary institutional capacity to address these expectations, and his presidency needs 
to maintain the perception of  power and control. As a result, he is incentivized to innovate hyper 
forms of  presidential rhetorical behavior as a survival instinct. His reliance on improvisational 
rhetoric offers Trump a means to attempt to navigate these dynamics in three ways.   
First, in the simplest sense, his improvisational rhetoric is able to fill space and attention 
that otherwise would be filled by political opponents and unfriendly media commentary. Steve 
Bannon, Trump’s former chief  strategist, reportedly refers to this tactic as “flood[ing] the zone 
with shit” (see Illing 2020). Media needs content and he provides it. His rhetoric falls far short 
of  strategically-crafted speech intended to, say, go public; but it gets the president through the 
next news cycle. Previous presidencies have used rhetoric as placeholders to buy time while the 
administration frantically goes to work on policy details (Holtzman 2010). Trump’s frequently-
used rhetorical signature “we’ll see” or “we’ll see what happens” suggests the same is occurring 
behind-the-scenes in his White House; but the “details to follow” rarely materialize.11 Instead, his 
improvisational rhetoric seems to be no more than talking for the sake of  talking.  
The ethos of  the hyper-rhetorical presidency, according to DiIulio, is “the politics of  having 
something to say about everything” (2004). To this, Trump has appended “…or about nothing.” 
In defense of  their argument that “presidential rhetoric is dead,” Stephen John Hartnett and 
Jennifer Rose Mercieca point to the George W. Bush administration’s efforts to “confuse public 
opinion, prevent citizen action, and frustrate citizen deliberation” by “marshaling ubiquitous 
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public chatter, waves of  disinformation, and cascades of  confusion-causing misdirection” (2007, 
600). As a consequence, this rhetoric has “left the nation awash in white noise, literally drowning 
in communicative trash” (Hartnett and Mercieca 2007, 601). 
Trump’s improvisational rhetoric, while perhaps not strategically crafted to mystify like 
that of  the Bush White House, has the same primary effect: the production of  white noise and 
communicative trash. Importantly, it also contributes to the creation of  a “ubiquitous presidency” 
that cultivates a “highly visible and nearly constant presence in both political and nonpolitical 
arenas of  American life via engagement in a fragmented media environment” (Scacco and Coe 
2016, 2). Even if  the president is speaking or tweeting incoherent nonsense—flooding the zone 
with shit—doing so holds the initiative, keeps public and media attention, and continuously 
thrusts the presidency into the center of  the American political order. 
The second way in which the reliance on improvisational rhetoric helps Trump navigate 
the dynamics of  the hyper-rhetorical presidency is that it is a behavior easy to practice. Unlike 
the onerous processes involved in professionalized speechwriting or the time, resources, skills, 
and expertise needed to effectively manage presidential images and spectacles, all Trump has to 
do is grab his phone. In this sense, it is a low-cost enterprise with considerable upside potential 
politically. Additionally, in a media-information environment in which truth is contested along 
partisan lines, there are few incentives for the president to maintain a relationship with facts or 
acquire an informed understanding of  the issues about which he communicates. This lowers the 
costs even further. The ease of  this rhetorical innovation renders the lack of  institutional capacity 
faced by modern presidencies largely inconsequential. “The president needs help” is no longer 
true when he is relying on improvisational rhetoric.  
Finally, Trump’s improvisation has the effect of  further personalizing the office, which is 
valuable currency in a presidential democracy. According to Lowi, the “personal” presidency 
“extends democratization by making himself  more accessible—appearing to make himself  
more accessible—to the people” (1985, 152). Digital technology presents the presidency as 
more accessible than ever before (Scacco and Coe, 2016). His constant use of  social media and 
unscripted, off-the-cuff  style creates “the impression that Trump says what he really thinks 
(Jamieson and Taussig 2017, 622 authors’ bold), thereby conveying a sense of  authenticity. The 
hyper-personalization of  Trump’s presidency, brought about in part by his reliance on digital 
rhetorical improvisation, functions as a means of  maintaining the perception of  power and 
control, at least among his most intense supporters.     
The Implications for Governance
Trump’s policy-oriented improvisational rhetorical has a detrimental impact on the American 
system of  governance. When the president improvises, the administration’s policy officials are 
left to improvise as well, “scrambling to reverse-engineer policies to meet Trump’s sudden public 
promises” (Rucker and Parker 2018). In the Trump presidency, members of  the administration 
appear to do so reflexively, with little apparent concern for the relative rationality or potential 
outcomes of  his pronouncements. For example, the Pentagon moved to create a “Space Force” 
after Trump’s public comments mentioned it in March 2018; National Guard troops were 
dispatched to the U.S.-Mexico border after Trump, at an April 2018 photo opportunity with 
Baltic leaders, announced that he would be sending the military; and the Commerce Department 
planned for auto tariffs after Trump threatened, by tweet, to impose them on Canada, Japan, and 
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Europe in June 2018. The president consistently conflates rhetoric and governance by presenting 
his personal decisions to tweet or speak as policy actions taken by the United States government—
and the United States government follows suit.   
Rhetoric is not policy; and yet, the administration’s policy apparatus is put into motion 
and guided by the whims of  a president publicly communicating off-the-cuff. This lack of  
coherent policy process suggests organizational dysfunction within the White House (Pfiffner 
2018, 164). This dysfunction is not simply the result of  Trump’s personal style of  management 
and “disinclination toward formal organization” (Pfiffner 2018, 153). Instead, it is a structural 
consequence of  eschewing the disciplined presidential communication processes that had been 
normalized for decades by previous administrations. Those processes included relevant parties 
from across the executive branch, which had the effect of  uniting disparate elements of  the 
administration. Additionally, in regard to its policy-oriented impact, former Bush counselor 
Karen Hughes explained that “[t]he process of  writing the speech forces the policy decisions to 
be finalized” (quoted in Max 2001). Without such processes, the structure of  the presidency is 
altered, perhaps beyond the current administration, and the capacity to produce coherent policy 
is compromised.   
Tulis (1987) emphasized that the tendencies and incentives to favor rhetoric as a tool of  
presidential leadership were not only a matter of  communication, but a matter of  governance. 
The result of  this distorted system of  governance is the same as the result of  Trump’s reliance 
on improvisational rhetoric: policy incoherence. In describing the hyper-rhetorical presidency, 
DiIulio identified the Bush administration’s “reflexive tendency to offer the presidential word 
as the policy deed” (2007, 319). The public’s inclination to mistake speech as policy—in that 
“[w]hatever the president says is generally assumed to be the position of  the executive branch 
and the policy of  the United States government” (Collier 2018, 36)—is actively promoted by 
the presidency itself. Except, in the Trump presidency, tweets have come to replace speech and 
likewise “have been treated as policy by much of  the nation, reflecting the degree to which 
whatever a president says is treated as policy—however he says it” (Collier 2018, 37). This state 
of  affairs represents a country currently governed by “adhocracy” (Haass 2017),12  which has 
been made devastatingly apparent by the president’s erratic management of  the Covid-19 crisis.
As previously acknowledged, there is little doubt that Trump’s idiosyncrasies, and his 
impulsivity in particular, play a significant role in his reliance on improvisational rhetoric. 
However, a Trump-specific explanation is not the whole story. Instead, it is important to widen 
the lens and recognize how his aberrant style of  governance is incentivized by the dynamics of  a 
distorted political order organized around the hyper-rhetorical presidency. The four theses on the 
hyper-rhetorical presidency articulated in this essay are not insulated from one another or static; 
they are co-dependent and dynamic, further intensifying iteration after iteration. The current 
dysfunctional system of  governance was dysfunctional when Trump inherited it. He will leave it 
more broken still and that brokenness will be normalized. The fundamental problem is not this 
president, it is systemic. Put another way, the fundamental problem is not that Trump improvises, 
but that the American polity abides it.
Postscript for Hopeful Possibility 
In his Foreword to the second edition of  The Rhetorical Presidency, Russell Muirhead 
references the hyper-rhetorical presidency construct and agrees that “DiIulio’s point is amplified 
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by the presidency of  Donald J. Trump,” who has “refined and brought to a new extreme the 
elements of  the rhetorical presidency” (2017, xiv). This raises questions of  how extreme the 
rhetorical behavior of  presidents can get and what systems of  governance are possible in a 
political order organized around such a presidency. 
Muirhead does not address these questions, but asserts that “Trump is the rhetorical presidency 
brought to its culmination, and perhaps to its breaking point” (2017, xv). This “breaking point,” he 
suggests, would mean the overwhelming of  constitutional restraints by presidential demagoguery 
(Muirhead 2017, xvi). But there is an alternative interpretation of  how the rhetorical presidency, 
and its current hyper-rhetorical manifestation, could reach their breaking point. In identifying 
the pathology of  the “personal presidency,” Lowi argued that “the solution ultimately lies not in 
specific reforms…but in a mature awareness of  the nature of  the problem” (1985, xii). Perhaps 
Trump’s rhetorical behavior is so radically “not normal” that it will finally jolt us awake, opening 
our eyes to how far down the road toward abnormality we have already traveled with the rhetorical 
presidency. And then, when the distorted American political order and its dysfunctional system 
of  governance come into full focus, perhaps we will maturely choose to leave the rhetorical 
presidency behind and travel a better path. 
Endnotes
1. Although fully developed by Tulis, for 
the original formulation of  the “rhetorical 
presidency” thesis, see Ceaser, Thurow, Tulis, and 
Bessette 1981.
2. For more on common mis-readings of  Tulis’s 
rhetorical presidency construct, see Crockett 
2003. 
3. DiIulio is very clear about leaving the hyper-
rhetorical presidency construct undeveloped and 
generally undefined: “Whether that concept can 
be refined to mean more than something like 
‘the rhetorical presidency on steroids’…I must 
leave to others” (2007, 318). Likewise, he leaves 
aside questions of  where it came from, when it 
emerged, how to stop it, and so on. “What I can 
do, however, is briefly highlight some preliminary 
answers and offer suggestive examples from my 
own reading and experiences indicating why I 
think such questions about the hyper-rhetorical 
presidency merit further reflection and research” 
(2007, 319). 
4. For examples of  references to DiIulio’s hyper-
rhetorical presidency construct, see Basinger and 
Rottinghaus 2012; Holtzman 2010, 2011; Saldin 
2011; Scacco and Coe 2016.
5. Three years before the publication of  his 
essay, I conducted an extensive interview with 
DiIulio for my dissertation research, during 
which he discussed his nascent notion of  the 
“hyper-rhetorical presidency.” I am grateful to 
Professor DiIulio for introducing me to the idea 
and supporting my efforts to run with it.
6. Research on the relationship between the 
presidency and media is a robust subfield in the 
scholarship on the American presidency. For 
examples of  some of  the seminal contributions 
in this area, and in media politics more generally, 
see Cohen 2008, 2009; Eshbaugh-Soha and 
Peake 2011; Farnsworth 2018; Farnsworth 
and Lichter 2006; Graber and Dunaway 2017; 
Iyengar 2018; Kumar 2007.    
7. For examples of  some of  the seminal 
contributions on presidents and agenda-setting, 
see Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Canes-Wrone 
2001; Cohen 1995; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 
2004; Kingdon 1995.
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  8. This argument regarding the perception of  
presidential power has perhaps been made most 
succinctly by the late U.S. Representative John 
P. Murtha (D-PA): “You know it’s an interesting 
thing when you think about presidents, you 
think of  how powerful they are. The presidency 
is only a perception of  power. There is no power 
in the presidency if  the public is not with him. 
(…) So an awful lot of  what happens…has 
something to do with the public relations and 
the public perception of  what goes on” (2006).
9. This idea of  rhetorical innovations as layered 
constructions of  a developmental phenomenon 
is borrowed from an essay by Stephen 
Skowronek (2009), in which he addresses the 
development of  presidential power. Particularly 
relevant is his notion that “constructions of  
[presidential] power superimpose themselves 
one on another, each implicated in the next” 
(2009, 2074). This developmental perspective 
mirrors that of  Tulis, who uses similar imagery 
to explain how the “second constitution” of  
the rhetorical presidency does not displace 
but is instead superimposed upon the original 
Constitution.    
10. Concerning the defining of  political reality, 
Zarefsky explains: “The definition of  the 
situation affects what counts as data for or 
against a proposal, highlights certain elements of  
the situation for use in arguments and obscures 
others, influences whether people will notice the 
situation and how they will handle it, describes 
causes and identifies remedies, and invites moral 
judgments about circumstances and individuals” 
(2004, 612). 
11. For more on Trump’s use of  the phrases 
“we’ll see” and “we’ll see what happens,” see 
Cillizza 2019; Keith 2017; Lucey and Thomas 
2017; Nussbaum 2017. 
12. “Adhocracy,” according to Richard Haass, 
former State Department Director of  Policy 
Planning and advisor to Secretary Colin 
Powell, is a style of  governing that “favors the 
unstructured and at times downright chaotic” 
and “offers a sharp contrast to more formal styles 
of  decision-making, in which participants with a 
legitimate stake in the outcome are included and 
others excluded; options are rigorously weighed 
in memos and then discussed at carefully run 
meetings; and those meetings in turn lead to 
decisions followed by clear assignments, closely 
monitored execution, and periodic review” 
(2017).
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